

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

FROM : F. S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 5/23/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 984922-12005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conmy _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

Referral/Direct

cc
Captioned Committee met on 5/23/73 and a copy of
the minutes are attached. Also attached is [redacted]

[redacted] It was the recommendation of the
Committee to follow these new relaxed instructions. It does not
appear that this will affect the FBI in any manner.

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Enclosed is a rundown of the briefing of [redacted]
[redacted] recently kidnapped in the Guadalajara area. *C*

Also enclosed ^{ARE} ~~is~~ procedures to be considered for
dealing with terrorist acts against American officials abroad.
Ambassador Meyer requested any comments at the next meeting
of anyone who had any suggestions to this procedure. This appears
to be a contingency plan for the foreign embassies and no suggestions
are needed from the FBI. *F*

Enclosures

C
7- ENCLOSURE
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
DEM

REC-84

62-115360-31

22 MAY 29 1973

FSP:cae
(2) *cae*

53 JUN 7 1973 *Kelly*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-05-2006 BY 60309
DATE August 16, 1973

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. 7 _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. Gebhardt *9/4/73*

FROM : R. F. Bates *MB*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. Bates
1 - Mr. F.S. Putman
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller

Reference is made to memorandum of F. S. Putman to E. S. Miller, dated August 3, 1973, advising that representatives of the Rand Corporation, Steven T. Hosmer, Deputy Vice President, National Security Research, The Rand Corporation, 2100 M Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20037, and [redacted] desired to discuss with representatives of the Bureau hostage situations in relationship to kidnappings in connection with a research paper they were preparing.

Mr. Hosmer and [redacted] met with myself, Inspector Richard J. Gallagher, and other representatives of the General Investigative Division on August 14, 1973. They were fully briefed on the many problems that exist in attempting to handle a kidnapping or hostage situation. They were advised that no set pattern can be established in the handling of these cases as each one is different and pretty much has to be "played by ear." They were very receptive to the presentation and felt the discussion would be extremely helpful to them.

ACTION:

For information.

RFB:jyl
(5)

EX-105
REC-21 62-115360-49

23 AUG 20 1973

23 AUG 23 1973

DO-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DATE: 10-27-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/mlt/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

10-27-2000 INFORMATION CONTAINED

MR. FELT

MR. BATES

MR. BISHOP

MR. CALLAHAN

MR. CAMPBELL

MR. CLEVELAND

MR. CONRAD

MR. DALBEY

MR. JENKINS

MR. MARSHALL

MR. MITCHELL

MR. PONDER

MR. SOYARS

MR. WALTERS

TELE. ROOM

MR. KINLEY

MR. ARMSTRONG

MS. HERWIG

MRS. NEENAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIV. I TO
COORDINATE

Jim
1-15
10:00P

BERNARD

I have Divisions I & II worked
with SAC WFO to do a
game plan as to how to handle
a seizure of 6 hostages at

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(C) b1

This should be done just as
soon as possible & I would like
to attend a critique of the Exercise

EC-83

62-115360-32

JUN 13 1973

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 *SDM/AB*
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2/19/78
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

67 JUN 14 1973

Run

0 Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism

50-6
OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

November 14, 1972

To: Mr. Kinley

Re: Cabinet Committee to Combat
Terrorism

Re memo of 11/10/72 to Mr. E. S.
Miller from W. O. Cregar on this
subject.

As you have requested I have initialed
this memorandum. However, I would
note two questions concerning the
division of responsibility between DID and GID for
supervising investigations of violations of the new
statute protecting foreign officials and guests.
These questions are submitted for information only
in view of the fact that the allocation of responsibility
has already been acted upon by Mr. Gray.

My questions are:

- (1) Does not a murder or a kidnaping investigation
require certain investigative expertise in all cases
without regard to whether "political consideration,
subversion or terrorist activity" is involved?
- (2) If so, does DID, given the nature of its responsi-
bilities, have the expertise to supervise these
criminal investigations as effectively as they could
be supervised by GID?

DMA:nm (2)
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Continued - Over

MR. FELT _____
MR. BAKER _____
MR. BISHOP _____
MR. CALLAHAN _____
MR. CLEVELAND _____
MR. CONRAD _____
MR. FENNER _____
MR. MARSHALL _____
MR. MILLER, E.S. _____
MR. PURVIS _____
MR. SOYARS _____
MR. WALTERS _____
TELE. ROOM _____
MR. KINLEY _____
MR. ARMSTRONG _____
MS. HERWIG _____
MRS. NEENAN _____

568

Concerning the above two questions, I confess to an opinion that they should be answered in favor of GID. It is not my desire to build up one Division at the expense of another, and if I ever become aware of a situation in which it seems that another Division is assuming responsibility for something which I believe falls more nearly within the expertise of DID, I would expect then to speak in favor of DID.

Dm Am
D. M. Armstrong, III

DO-8 Office of the Acting Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

11-13, 1972

<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Felt	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bland
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Baker	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Dunphy
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Bishop	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. M. A. Jones
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Callahan	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Malmfeldt
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Cleveland	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Donahoe
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Conrad	<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Kinley
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Dalbey	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mr. Armstrong
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Gebhardt	<input type="checkbox"/> Ms. Herwig
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Jenkins	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Marshall	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Miller, E.S.	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Purvis	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Soyars	
<input type="checkbox"/> Mr. Walters	

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DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
Room tam/mlt/elh

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☐ Telephone Room
☐ Reception Room
☐ Reading Room
☐ Records Branch
☐ Mail Room

☐ For your information
☐ Note and Return
☒ Please Initial
☐ Expedite Processing - Route
☐ Place on record and return to Room 5631
☐ Pull, mail, and return yellow copy

☐ See Me
☐ Call Me
☐ Please Type

But see note - DMA3.

David D. Kinley
Ext. 3457

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Gebhardt

1 - Mr. **[REDACTED]**
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller

DATE: 11/10/72

1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Belanger

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Reference is made to a memorandum from W.O. Cregar to Mr. E.S. Miller dated 10/30/72, captioned as above, wherein it was noted that a Headquarters contingency plan would be prepared by the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) and submitted for Mr. Gray's approval. Attached contingency plan is being submitted for Mr. Gray's approval.

As noted in a memorandum dated 10/27/72, captioned "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States," the DID and the General Investigative Division (GID) proposed that responsibility of each Division regarding the subject statute be divided as follows:

(1) GID will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department of Justice where there is no indication of political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity but will handle all plane hijacking cases.

(2) DID will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department where indications exist that political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity are involved in the violation, exclusive of plane hijackings.

Mr. Gray approved the Division of responsibility for the new legislation as noted above on 11/1/72.

The enclosed DID contingency plan will be utilized to the extent necessary in the event of a terrorist act, supervision of which rests with DID. It will be noted that the appendices of the contingency plan will include documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U. S. Government agencies, agreements between DID and GID, and other material deemed to be of assistance to personnel handling these matters. These documents will be added to the appendices as received.

Enclosure
LEB:tdp (5)

REC-83

CONTINUED - OVER

11 JUN 13 1973

ENCLOSURE

67 JUN 14 1973

ENCLOSURE ON BULKY RAMP

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

ACTION:

If Mr. Gray approves the enclosed DID contingency plan, the following action will be taken:

(1) Copies of the contingency plan will be furnished to all personnel having responsibilities under the plan.

(2) The master copy of the plan will be maintained in DID Duty Supervisor's Office, Room 1002, 9&D Building.

ESM

REG

EM

RJG

DGF

AS

Fran

Dm A3

DDK

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HQ-115360

Serial 33



62-HQ-115360-33

BULKY

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DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309

62-115360-33
BULKY ENCLOSURE
BIN # 15-G / 605

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS
OF THE UNITED STATES

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
CONTINGENCY PLAN

62-115360-33



8/17/02

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

Both the Intelligence Division (ID) and the General Investigative Division (GID) have responsibility for supervising violations coming within the purview of "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States." In the main, ID responsibilities under the Act involve terrorist acts where violence is used, or the serious and imminent threat of such an act requiring immediate reaction; provided that the act has international political ramifications either because of its purpose or because of the individuals involved.

GID supervisory responsibilities are incurred upon a serious violation of the Act, such as a nonpolitically motivated or nonsubversive kidnaping, murder, or assault and the like upon a victim covered by the Act. GID also handles all aircraft hijackings under the Act.

In the event of a serious violation of the Act supervised by ID, the following notification procedures will be adhered to, and the contingency plan hereinafter set forth will be activated. In the case of a violation of the Act supervised by ID, the following notification procedures will be followed.

Notify:

- (a) Assistant Director W. Raymond Wannall, who will notify Mr. Miller, who, in turn, will notify Mr. Callahan, who will notify Mr. Kelley.
- (b) Assistant Director R. E. Gebhardt, GID
- (c) Section Chief F. S. Putman, Jr., who will notify Inspector A. J. Decker, Jr.
- (d) Deputy Director for Operations
Department of State Operations Center (DSOC)
[redacted]
- (e) White House Situation Room
[redacted]
- (f) Secret Service Intelligence Division
[redacted]
- (g) Section Chief, Criminal Section, GID,
extension [redacted] or during nonworking hours,
GID Duty Supervisor, extension [redacted]
- (h) [redacted] (Div. 5) or his

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alternate, [redacted]
(Div. 6), who are members of the Emergency
Watch Group at the State Department.

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(i) Department of Justice Information Center

Note that thereafter in each case, as a double check, the DSOC will, in turn, notify the FBI, The White House Situation Room, Secret Service Intelligence Division, and the National Security Agency Command Center. In its return call to the FBI, the DSOC will maintain an open line.

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Mr. Putman will handle notification to [redacted]
[redacted] home [redacted] Department of Justice, telephone
[redacted] in these matters.

ID Command Center

Location

The ID Command Center, hereinafter referred to as IDCC, will be located in Room 1002, 9th & D Building, telephone extensions 2078 and 2079.

Chain of Command

The IDCC will be under the direct supervision of Assistant Director Wannall. Assisting Mr. Wannall will be Inspector A. J. Decker, Jr., and in charge of coordinating the case and all incoming and outgoing communications will be Section Chief F. S. Putman, Jr.,

Manpower

At IDCC

- (1) Section Chief, CI-3
- (2) Unit Chief and Supervisor handling these matters
- (3) Security Patrol Clerks (2) (After duty hours only)
- (4) Clerk Stenographers (2)

At other locations

- (1) Supervisory Special Agents from Sections affected and as needed

2/6/74

- (2) Sufficient clerical and stenographic personnel to be assigned if possible from CI-3 Section.

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- (3) Upon proper notification, [redacted] ID, or his alternate, [redacted] GID, members of Emergency Watch Group (EWG) will proceed to the DSOC, Room 7516 of the State Department. Supervisor [redacted] or [redacted] can be reached by use of the direct line to the DSOC and will receive all information flowing between the FBI and the EWG.

Communications

Telephone

Bureau extensions 2078 and 2079 presently serve IDCC. Extensions 2121, 2122, and 2123 are extensions contiguous to IDCC and can be used as back up extensions. The main telephone instrument has unclassified extension service to The White House Situation Room. Two extension instruments have a direct unclassified extension to the Department of State Operations Center extension [redacted]. Extension telephones also have extension service to the Guard Desk in the lobby of the 9th and D Building.

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In addition to the above, the "Green" telephone and the "Grey" telephone provide secure voice service to the United States intelligence community. The "Green" telephone may be used for classified conversations with certain Legats.

Teletype

The ID teletype room adjacent to IDCC operates on an around-the-clock basis.

Radio

Portable voice radio receivers-transmitters connect the messenger room at Justice with IDCC and the courier truck.

Appended hereto are documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U. S. Government agencies, agreements between ID and GID personnel handling these matters.

2/6/74

APPENDICES

- Appendix A - H. R. 15883 - "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix B - Memorandum T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller dated October 27, 1972 - "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix C - Memorandum dated December 19, 1972, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, to Acting Director - "Assignment of Investigative Jurisdiction."
- Appendix D - Memorandum dated October 27, 1972, from Ambassador Armin Meyer, Department of State, regarding "Administrative Machinery for Dealing with Terrorist Acts" and enclosing "Standard Procedures for Responding to International Terrorist Acts Occurring Within the United States" as approved by the Working Group, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.
- Appendix E - Letter dated November 10, 1972, setting forth agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense concerning assistance from the Department of Defense to the FBI in connection with acts of terrorism and related memorandum dated 3/13/73.
- Appendix F - Department of Defense (DOD) teletypes May 18, 1973, and August 13, 1973, concerning DOD support to the FBI in combating terrorism.
- Appendix G - Correspondence concerning the Department of Justice Information Center.

8/17/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-26-2006 BY 60309

Ninety-second Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

*Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the eighteenth day of January,
one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two*

An Act

To amend title 18, United States Code, to provide for expanded protection of foreign officials, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States".

STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. The Congress recognizes that from the beginning of our history as a nation, the police power to investigate, prosecute, and punish common crimes such as murder, kidnaping, and assault has resided in the several States, and that such power should remain with the States.

The Congress finds, however, that harassment, intimidation, obstruction, coercion, and acts of violence committed against foreign officials or their family members in the United States or against official guests of the United States adversely affect the foreign relations of the United States.

Accordingly, this legislation is intended to afford the United States jurisdiction concurrent with that of the several States to proceed against those who by such acts interfere with its conduct of foreign affairs.

TITLE I—MURDER OR MANSLAUGHTER OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS

SEC. 101. Chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sections:

"§ 1116. Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials or official guests

"(a) Whoever kills a foreign official or official guest shall be punished as provided under sections 1111 and 1112 of this title, except that any such person who is found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life.

"(b) For the purpose of this section 'foreign official' means—

"(1) a Chief of State or the political equivalent, President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Ambassador, Foreign Minister, or other officer of cabinet rank or above of a foreign government or the chief executive officer of an international organization, or any person who has previously served in such capacity, and any member of his family, while in the United States; and

"(2) any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee.

"(c) For the purpose of this section:

"(1) 'Foreign government' means the government of a foreign country, irrespective of recognition by the United States.

"(2) 'International organization' means a public international organization designated as such pursuant to section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 U.S.C. 288).

"(3) 'Family' includes (a) a spouse, parent, brother or sister,

THE WHITE HOUSE

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child, or person to whom the foreign official stands in loco parentis, or (b) any other person living in his household and related to the foreign official by blood or marriage.

"(4) 'Official guest' means a citizen or national of a foreign country present in the United States as an official guest of the government of the United States pursuant to designation as such by the Secretary of State.

"§ 1117. Conspiracy to murder

"If two or more persons conspire to violate section 1111, 1114, or 1116 of this title, and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."

SEC. 102. The analysis of chapter 51 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new items:

"1116. Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials or official guests.

"1117. Conspiracy to murder."

TITLE II—KIDNAPING

SEC. 201. Section 1201 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"§ 1201. Kidnaping

"(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when:

"(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce;

"(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States;

"(3) any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 101 (32) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1301 (32)); or

"(4) the person is a foreign official as defined in section 1116 (b) or an official guest as defined in section 1116 (c) (4) of this title, shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

"(b) With respect to subsection (a) (1), above, the failure to release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnaped, abducted, or carried away shall create a rebuttable presumption that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

"(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life."

SEC. 202. The analysis of chapter 55 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by deleting

"1201. Transportation.",

and substituting the following:

"1201. Kidnaping."

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**TITLE III—PROTECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS
AND OFFICIAL GUESTS**

SEC. 301. Section 112 of title 18, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

“§ 112. Protection of foreign officials and official guests

“(a) Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds, imprisons, or offers violence to a foreign official or official guest shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. Whoever in the commission of any such act uses a deadly or dangerous weapon shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

“(b) Whoever willfully intimidates, coerces, threatens, or harasses a foreign official or an official guest, or willfully obstructs a foreign official in the performance of his duties, shall be fined not more than \$500, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

“(c) Whoever within the United States but outside the District of Columbia and within one hundred feet of any building or premises belonging to or used or occupied by a foreign government or by a foreign official for diplomatic or consular purposes, or as a mission to an international organization, or as a residence of a foreign official, or belonging to or used or occupied by an international organization for official business or residential purposes, publicly—

“(1) parades, pickets, displays any flag, banner, sign, placard, or device, or utters any word, phrase, sound, or noise, for the purpose of intimidating, coercing, threatening, or harassing any foreign official or obstructing him in the performance of his duties, or

“(2) congregates with two or more other persons with the intent to perform any of the aforesaid acts or to violate subsection (a) or (b) of this section,

shall be fined not more than \$500, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

“(d) For the purpose of this section ‘foreign official’, ‘foreign government’, ‘international organization’, and ‘official guest’ shall have the same meanings as those provided in sections 1116 (b) and (c) of this title.

“(e) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”

SEC. 302. The analysis of chapter 7 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by deleting

“112. Assaulting certain foreign diplomats and other official personnel.”

and adding at the beginning thereof the following new item:

“112. Protection of foreign officials and official guests.”

**TITLE IV—PROTECTION OF PROPERTY OF FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS**

SEC. 401. Chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

“§ 970. Protection of property occupied by foreign governments

“(a) Whoever willfully injures, damages, or destroys, or attempts to injure, damage, or destroy, any property, real or personal, located within the United States and belonging to or utilized or occupied by any foreign government or international organization, by a foreign official or official guest, shall be fined not more than \$10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

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H.R. 15883-4

"(b) For the purpose of this section 'foreign official', 'foreign government', 'international organization', and 'official guest' shall have the same meanings as those provided in sections 1116 (b) and (c) of this title."

SEC. 402. The analysis of chapter 45 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new item:

"9.0. Protection of property occupied by foreign governments."

SEC. 3. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to indicate an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which its provisions operate to the exclusion of the laws of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia on the same subject matter, nor to relieve any person of any obligation imposed by any law of any State, Commonwealth, territory, possession, or the District of Columbia.

Carl Albert

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

James O. Eastland

*Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.*

APPROVED

OCT 24 1972

Robert F. Kennedy

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
ADAT/et 10/27/72 lh

felt ✓
Baker ✓
Bates ✓
Bishop ✓
Callahan ✓
Cleveland ✓
Conrad ✓
Dalbey ✓
Jenkins ✓
Marshall ✓
Mitter, E.S. ✓
Ponder ✓
Soyars ✓
Walters ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Mr. Kinley ✓
Mr. Armstrong ✓
Ms. Herwig ✓
Mrs. Neenan ✓

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS*

SUBJECT: ACT FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS
OF THE UNITED STATES

- 1 - Mr. Bates
- 1 - Mr. Dalbey
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Cregar
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

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On 10/19/72 Section Chiefs William O. Cregar and Thomas J. Smith, Domestic Intelligence Division, met with Section Chief Henry A. Schutz and SA [redacted] General Investigative Division, concerning the responsibility each Division would have concerning the above-captioned new legislation. The following arrangement was agreed upon, subject to approval by Assistant Directors of each Division and the Acting Director.

1) General Investigative Division will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department of Justice where there is no indication of political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity, but will handle all plane hijacking cases.

2) Domestic Intelligence Division will handle all violations of the Act assigned to the FBI by the Department where indications exist that political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity are involved in the violation, exclusive of plane hijackings.

It was recognized by the Agents discussing the matter that it will often be impossible to know at the outset if political consideration or subversion is involved. This could be particularly true in cases of murder and assault. However, our experience has shown that usually one of the primary factors in a case involving political considerations (which term is actually broad enough to cover subversion and terrorist activity) is the desire for publicity. Typically, an act of depredation or intimidation against a foreign official has been accompanied by a note or telephone call claiming credit for the act.

On the other hand, it was recognized that the converse may be true. A purely criminal act could be disguised behind a bogus

TJS:bjr
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Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Act for Protection of Foreign
Officials and Official Guests
of the United States

proclamation of a supposed terrorist. In either event it was believed that representatives of both Divisions would work in close harmony using the expertise of each so long as it was obviously necessary.

Domestic Intelligence Division certainly realizes that in cases of kidnaping the General Investigative Division has unique experience which must be utilized notwithstanding the fact it may not be a classical case of kidnaping for ransom. By the same token the Domestic Intelligence Division has a broad background and experience in dealing with extremists and terrorists and such knowledge should be beneficial to the General Investigative Division in some cases.

While the division of responsibility set forth above may appear to be oversimplified, it is believed that whenever a violation under the new statute occurs rapid determination and agreement for supervisory responsibility can be made and that complete inter-Division cooperation will prevail. If after a case has been under investigation it develops that primary investigative responsibility has been assumed by the wrong Division, transfer of such responsibility can be reassigned if the Assistant Directors agree that such would be in the best interest of the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

That inter-Division responsibility for supervision of violations growing out of the Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States be established as set out above.

Approved. *[Signature]*
G...
11-1
8:21 P

EM
CWB
WGC
HAG
RSG
G...
AD
TOM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt

DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
WST/mt/elh

Mr. E. S. Miller

3/13/73

H. A. Boynton, Jr.

1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
① - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. H. A. Boynton, Jr.
1 - Mr. J. E. Manning

SUPPORT FOR FBI
OPERATIONS BY THE OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE
LIAISON MATTER

This memorandum sets forth the structure of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense which may be utilized to support Bureau operations.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller, 3/6/73, captioned "Use of Federal Troops To Assist The FBI." Memorandum concerns meeting between representatives of the Bureau, Department of Defense (DOD) and Attorney General's Office concerning Posse Comitatus Act. This memorandum does not concern that Act but rather the mechanics for obtaining support through the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Also attached is a letter to former Secretary of Defense Laird from the Attorney General.

The present situation involving the American Indian Movement (AIM) at Wounded Knee, South Dakota, necessitated DOD support for the Bureau on 3/2/73. Problems arose inasmuch as Department of Justice (DJ) representatives had previously contacted DOD officials concerning support such as aerial surveillance, shipment of gas masks and body armor. To better understand the DOD's apparent slowness in reacting to an FBI request, the following is set forth.

[redacted] is the [redacted]
[redacted] and also a [redacted] He
has two military assistants to his staff, [redacted]
[redacted] U. S. Army (USA), and [redacted]
[redacted] Any requests for military assistance and Air Force
transportation must be submitted to [redacted] Office.
In other than routine matters involving support of civilian

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Enclosures - 2

JEM:d1m
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

8/17/73

E5

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Support for FBI
Operations by the Office of
the Secretary for Defense

agencies by DOD, [] cannot make a decision without first consulting the Office of the General Counsel of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt. Previous contacts with [] and [] have been most cordial and arrangements were made through them for the utilization of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) for the transportation of Bureau personnel carrying highly classified documents. Problems arose on 3/2/73 in the Office of [] in that requests were being received from the Department and the Bureau concerning the situation at Wounded Knee. Request to transport weapons and ammunition via the U. S. Air Force necessitated an approval from Mr. Buzhardt's Office. [] advised that there can be only one contact from either the FBI or DJ with [] Office on an operation such as Wounded Knee. It was decided after a call from Mr. Buzhardt to [] that the Attorney General would be the point of contact through his assistant []. However, [] and [] continued to honor Bureau requests on 3/2/73. [] at that time volunteered his services in the event the Bureau has a similar problem where the Bureau is the only agency involved. He stated that prior to a formal request, he is able to furnish information concerning the location of certain weapons and the means by which they may be transported.

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On 3/2/73 when approval for the use of automatic weapons by the Attorney General was received by Mr. Buzhardt in the late afternoon and the request submitted to [] Office, [] and [] immediately contacted the Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) to locate the requested equipment and to transport it to Pine Ridge, South Dakota, by the most expeditious and cheapest means. Prior to this moment, the Attorney General has given instructions that automatic weapons were not to be requested from DOD. DOMS may draw support from all the facilities of DOD. The locations of weapons and equipment is computerized and aircraft is located through the Air Force for transportation. If necessary, the Air Force will contract for commercial carrier to get the equipment to its destination as fast as possible.

8/17/73

E 6

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Support for FBI
Operations by the Office of
the Secretary for Defense

In the event a similar situation arises and the Bureau desires to determine what support may be obtained, it is suggested that Liaison Section be contacted to determine from [] or [] what type of support is available. The following items are necessary:

b6
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- (1) A description of the type of equipment necessary;
- (2) The citation number of the Bureau's appropriation;
- (3) Necessary documents of an authorization for [] Office.
- (4) If Bureau equipment is to be transported, the weight and cube and number of boxes are necessary.

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As an example of the priorities and resources of DOMS a Special Air Mission (SAM) plane and helicopter were utilized on 3/3/73 to transport ammunition from Quantico via Andrews Air Force Base to South Dakota. This was Bureau ammunition for Bureau weapons being utilized by Special Agents at Wounded Knee. It is to be pointed out that the request was submitted through the Attorney General's Office and in turn relayed to [] Office.

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For your information the military assistants in [] Office are highly selected representatives of the military. Former assistants in this Office include General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., currently Deputy Chief of Staff, USA, formerly Assistant to Dr. Kissinger; Mr. Alexander P. Butterfield who is Executive Assistant to the President and has been appointed by the President as Director of Federal Aviation Agency; [] U. S. Military Academy. The above were Lt. Colonels serving as military assistants in the Office of the Special Assistant at sometime during the past ten years.

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b7C

ACTION:

None. For information.

8/17/73

E 7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. E. S. Miller



5/17/73

T. J. Smith

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. Putman
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

NONMILITARY INCIDENTS WHICH COULD
HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

Referral/Direct



Referral/Direct

By memorandum dated 4/4/73 to the Deputy Attorney General, attention of Mr. Charles D. Ablard, the Acting Director advised that the FBI already has contingency plans which will be implemented in the event of a terrorist attack involving Public Law 92-539 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States) and that the FBI will be direct contact with the Department of State Operations Center in this regard and that the DJIC will now also be notified in the event of a terrorist attack.

The attached letter to the Deputy Attorney General reiterates information furnished in our letter of 4/4/73 and points out the Intelligence Division will be the FBI's point of contact in all matters bearing an impact on foreign relations except aircraft hijackings which are handled by the General Investigative Division. Work hours and nonwork hours telephone numbers are set out for the information of the Deputy Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION: That the attached letter be approved.

8/17/73
Enclosure

CEE:bjr (5)

G-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2006 BY 60309
auc tam/dcg/eMay 18, 1973

The Deputy Attorney General

Acting Director, FBI

NONMILITARY INCIDENTS WHICH COULD
HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR
CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. Putman
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 1, 1973,
and my memorandum to the attention of Mr. Charles D. Ablard
dated April 4, 1973, captioned as above.

As you are aware, the FBI maintains continuous
around-the-clock operations in its 59 field offices and also
at Headquarters. This includes a communications network.
The three investigative Divisions at FBI Headquarters respon-
sible for criminal and national security matters under the
FBI's investigative jurisdiction maintain separate night and
weekend duty offices to assure a continuity of investigative
and dissemination responsibility.

Over a period of several years, the FBI, through its
night and weekend duty offices, has kept the White House, Secret
Service, Department of Justice, State Department, other appro-
priate agencies of the Government, and the intelligence community
advised on a timely basis of all matters coming to its atten-
tion bearing on the national welfare.

As pointed out in referenced memorandum of April 4,
1973, the FBI, by virtue of its active participation in the
Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, already has contingency
plans and will play a key role in the event of a terrorist
attack involving Public Law 92-539. While FBI contingency
plans provide for notification to a representative of the
Criminal Division of the Department, it basically involves
a direct liaison arrangement with the State Department where
an FBI representative will be present in the State Department
Operations Center. FBI contingency plans have been amended to
also include notification to the Department of Justice Infor-
mation Center. Since the Department of Justice will, of course,
be represented at the State Department Operations Center and will

CEE:bjr
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

62

The Deputy Attorney General

be receiving simultaneously all information being furnished by the FBI directly to the State Department, we anticipate no continuing notification of developments due to the tremendous volume of communications traffic and manpower drain which will exist under emergency conditions.

[redacted] For your information, Special Agent [redacted] Intelligence Division, is the FBI representative who will report to the State Department Operations Center in the event of a terrorist attack which falls under Public Law 92-539. The Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism specifically devised the procedures providing for direct liaison between the FBI and State Department in the event of a terrorist attack.

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As noted in referenced memorandum of April 4, 1973, a Special Agent on duty in the Intelligence Division during nonwork hours should be the FBI's single point of contact during such hours in any matters bearing on the impact on foreign relations except aircraft hijackings. The telephone number in the Intelligence Division during nonwork hours is Code 175-2078 (202-324-2078). During regular work hours, calls should be directed to the office of Assistant Director Edward S. Miller, Intelligence Division, telephone Code 175-2121 (202-324-2121), as the FBI's initial point of contact except for aircraft hijacking matters.

Matters relating to aircraft hijackings are handled by the General Investigative Division and all inquiries related to such matters should be directed to that Division. The telephone number of the Special Agent on duty during non-work hours in the General Investigative Division is Code [redacted]

b2

[redacted] During work hours such inquiries should be directed to the office of Assistant Director Robert E. Gebhardt, General Investigative Division, telephone Code [redacted]

The night and weekend duty Special Agents are under instruction to contact appropriate responsible officials of the FBI at any hour in the event of significant happenings. Incidents which could have an adverse impact on foreign relations would be sufficient reason to alert such officials.

You may be assured that as in the past all matters coming to the attention of the FBI of interest to the Department of Justice will be furnished to the Department of Justice on an expeditious around-the-clock basis.

The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller
dated 5/17/73, captioned as above, prepared by CEE:bjr.

8/17/73

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DATE 4/3/73 2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. E. S. Miller

T. J. Smith

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
① - Mr. Putman
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

NON-MILITARY INCIDENTS
WHICH COULD HAVE ADVERSE
IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

By letter dated 3/30/73 (attached), the Deputy Attorney General requested that a representative of the FBI attend a meeting at 2 p.m., 4/2/73, to discuss a requirement for the immediate preparation of a plan providing for prompt Departmental response on a 24-hour basis, to the occurrence of non-military incidents which could have an adverse impact upon the conduct of our foreign relations. Assistant Director E. S. Miller was designated by the Acting Director to go. SA T. J. Smith accompanied Mr. Miller.

Referral/Direct

The meeting was chaired by Mr. Charles D. Ablard, Associate Deputy Attorney General. A memorandum (copy attached) was distributed to each person attending the meeting.

Enclosures

Referral/Direct

TJS:bjr
(5)

CONTINUED - OVER

8/17/73

G.9

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Non-Military Incidents
Which Could Have Adverse
Impact on Foreign Relations

Referral/Direct

Referral/Direct

Our existing plan requires that we notify [redacted]
[redacted] of the Criminal Division of the Department in case of a
terrorist attack. Mr. Miller informed Mr. Ablard that we will also
notify DJIC of such attacks so that it will be informed of the matter.

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Referral/Direct

A letter with this information is attached for approval.

Referral/Direct

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be approved.

8/17/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2006 BY 60309
auc tam/dcg/elh

The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Mr. Charles D. Albard

April 4, 1973

Acting Director, FBI

NON-MILITARY INCIDENTS
WHICH COULD HAVE ADVERSE
IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. Putman
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

Reference is made to your letter of March 30, 1973, requesting that an FBI representative attend a meeting April 2, 1973, in the Deputy Attorney General's Conference Room to discuss captioned matter.

As noted during the meeting, the FBI already has contingency plans which will be implemented in the event of a terrorist attack involving Public Law 92-539 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States) and will be in direct contact with the Department of State Operations Center in this regard.

As noted also, our contingency plan calls for our notification of Mr. Laurence McWhorter of the Criminal Division of the Department or such other official of the Criminal Division who may be designated in the future in the event of a terrorist attack. We will now add the Department of Justice Information Center (DJIC) telephone [redacted] [redacted] as a separate office within the Department to be notified in the event of a terrorist attack.

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While DJIC is aware of our 24-hour operation in the FBI, for the record the number where an FBI Special Agent will be on duty for the Intelligence Division during nonwork hours is code 175-2078 (202-324-2078). This Special Agent should be considered the FBI's single point of contact during nonwork hours. At other times calls should be directed to the office of Assistant Director E. S. Miller, Intelligence Division, telephone: code 175-2121 (202-324-2121) as the FBI's initial point of contact.

TJS:bjr
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

8/17/73

G11

The Deputy Attorney General

NOTE:

See memorandum T. J. Smith to Mr. E. S. Miller dated 4/3/73, captioned as above, prepared by TJS:bjr.

8/17/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-08-2006 BY 60309
auc tam/dcg/elh

ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
OFFICIALS AND OFFICIAL GUESTS
OF THE UNITED STATES

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
CONTINGENCY PLAN

2

Notification Procedures

Both the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) and the General Investigative Division (GID) have responsibility for supervising violations coming within the purview of "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States." In the main, DID responsibilities under the Act involve terrorist acts where violence is used, or the serious and imminent threat of such an act requiring immediate reaction; provided that the act has international political ramifications either because of its purpose or because of the individuals involved.

GID supervisory responsibilities are incurred upon a serious violation of the Act, such as a nonpolitically motivated or subversive kidnaping, murder, or assault and the like upon a victim covered by the Act. GID also handles all aircraft hijackings under the Act.

In the event of a serious violation of the Act supervised by DID, the following notification procedures will be adhered to, and the contingency plan hereinafter set forth will be activated. In the case of a violation of the Act supervised by GID, the following notification procedures will be followed.

Notify:

- (a) Assistant Director E. S. Miller, who will notify Mr. Felt, who, in turn, will notify Mr. Gray
- (b) Assistant Director R. E. Gebhardt, GID
- (c) Section Chief W. O. Cregar
- (d) Deputy Director for Operations
Department of State Operations Center (DSOC)
[redacted]
- (e) White House Situation Room
[redacted]
- (f) Secret Service Intelligence Division
[redacted]
- (g) Section Chief, Criminal Section, GID,
extension [redacted] or during nonworking hours,
GID Duty Supervisor, extension [redacted]
- (h) Supervisor [redacted] (Div. 5) or his
alternate, Supervisor [redacted] (Div. 6),
who are members of the Emergency Watch Group
at the State Department

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Note that thereafter in each case, as a double check, the DSOC will, in turn, notify the FBI, The White House Situation Room, Secret Service Intelligence Division, and the National Security Agency Command Center. In its return call to the FBI, the DSOC will maintain an open line.

Mr. Cregar will handle notification to Mr. Lawrence McWhorter, Department of Justice, telephone [redacted] in these matters.

DID Command Center

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Location

The DID Command Center, hereinafter referred to as DCC, will be located in Room 1002, 9th & D Building, telephone extensions 2078 and 2079.

Chain of Command

The DCC will be under the direct supervision of Assistant Director Miller. Assisting Mr. Miller and in charge of coordinating the case and all incoming and outgoing communications will be the DID Section Chief having investigative responsibility for the terroristic act. In each case, Mr. Miller will designate the Section Chief to fill the post.

Manpower

At DCC

- (1) Section Chief in charge
- (2) Number 1 Man to be selected from Section involved
- (3) Security Patrol Clerks (2) (After duty hours only)
- (4) Clerk Stenographers (2)

At other locations

- (1) Supervisory Special Agents from Section affected and as needed
- (2) Sufficient clerical and stenographic personnel to be assigned if possible from Section affected
- (3) Upon proper notification, Supervisor [redacted] DID, or his alternate, Supervisor [redacted] GID, members of the Emergency Watch Group (EWG) will proceed to the DSOC,

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room 7516 of the State Department. Supervisor [] or [] can be reached by use of the direct line to the DSOC and will receive all information flowing between the FBI and the EWG.

Communications

Telephone

b2

Bureau extensions 2078 and 2079 presently serve DCC. Extensions 2121, 2122, and 2123 are extensions contiguous to DCC and can be used as back up extensions. The main telephone instrument has unclassified extension service to The White House Situation Room. Two extension instruments have a direct unclassified extension to the Department of State Operations Center extension []. Extension telephones also have extension service to the Guard Desk in the lobby of the 9th & D Building.

In addition to the above, the "Green" telephone and the "Grey" telephone provide secure voice service to the United States intelligence community. The "Green" telephone may be used for classified conversations with certain Legats.

Teletype

The DID teletype room adjacent to DCC operates on an around-the-clock basis.

Radio

Portable voice radio receivers-transmitters connect the messenger room at Justice with DCC and the courier truck.

Appended hereto are documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U.S. Government agencies, agreements between DID and GID, and other material deemed to be of assistance to personnel handling these matters.

APPENDICES

- Appendix A - H. R. 15883 - "Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix B - Memorandum T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller dated October 27, 1972 - "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States."
- Appendix C - Memorandum dated December 19, 1972, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, to Acting Director - "Assignment of Investigative Jurisdiction."
- Appendix D - Memorandum dated October 27, 1972, from Ambassador Armin Meyer, Department of State, regarding "Administrative Machinery for Dealing with Terrorist Acts" and enclosing "Standard Procedures for Responding to International Terrorist Acts Occurring Within the United States" as approved by the Working Group, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

2.

AGENCY

NAME

OFFICE ADDRESS

OFFICE PHONE

HOME PHONE

CIA

Room 6B07
Room 6D26
Room 6G28

NSC Staff

Room 396
Old EOB

Domestic Council

Room 16
Old EOB

FBI

FBI Hdq.
FBI Hdq.

b2
b6
b7C

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Notification Procedures

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GID supervisory responsibilities are incurred upon a serious violation of the Act, such as a nonpolitically motivated or nonsubversive kidnaping, murder, or assault and the like upon a victim covered by the Act. GID also handles all aircraft hijackings under the Act.

In the event of a serious violation of the Act supervised by ID, the following notification procedures will be adhered to, and the contingency plan hereinafter set forth will be activated. In the case of a violation of the Act supervised by GID, the following notification procedures will be followed.

Notify:

- (a) Assistant Director E. S. Miller, who will notify Mr. Callahan, who, in turn, will notify Mr. Kelley
- (b) Assistant Director R. E. Gebhardt, GID
- (c) Section Chief F. S. Putman, Jr.
- (d) Deputy Director for Operations
Department of State Operations Center (DSOC)
[redacted]
- (e) White House Situation Room
[redacted]
- (f) Secret Service Intelligence Division
[redacted]
- (g) Section Chief, Criminal Section, GID,
extension [redacted] or during nonworking hours,
GID Duty Supervisor, extension [redacted]
- (h) Supervisor [redacted] (Div. 5) or his

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b7C

8/17/73

alternate, Supervisor [redacted] (Div. 6),
who are members of the Emergency Watch Group
at the State Department.

b2
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b7C

(i) Department of Justice Information Center

[redacted]
Note that thereafter in each case, as a double check,
the DSOC will, in turn, notify the FBI, The White House
Situation Room, Secret Service Intelligence Division, and the
National Security Agency Command Center. In its return call
to the FBI, the DSOC will maintain an open line.

Mr. Putman will handle notification to [redacted]
[redacted] Department of Justice, telephone
[redacted] in these matters.

ID Command Center

Location

The ID Command Center, hereinafter referred to as DCC,
will be located in Room 1002, 9th & D Building, telephone ex-
tensions 2078 and 2079.

Chain of Command

The DCC will be under the direct supervision of
Assistant Director Miller. Assisting Mr. Miller and in charge
of coordinating the case and all incoming and outgoing communi-
cations will be the ID Section Chief having investigative respon-
sibility for the terroristic act. In each case, Mr. Miller
will designate the Section Chief to fill the post.

Manpower

At DCC

- (1) Section Chief in charge
- (2) Number 1 Man to be selected from Section involved
- (3) Security Patrol Clerks (2) (After duty hours only)
- (4) Clerk Stenographers (2)

At other locations

- (1) Supervisory Special Agents from Section
affected and as needed

8/17/73

(2) Sufficient clerical and stenographic personnel to be assigned if possible from Section affected

(3) Upon proper notification, Supervisor [redacted] ID, or his alternate, Supervisor [redacted] GID, members of Emergency Watch Group (EWG) will proceed to the DSOC, Room 7516 of the State Department. Supervisor [redacted] can be reached by use of the direct line to the DSOC and will receive all information flowing between the FBI and the EWG.

b6
b7C

Communications

Telephone

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b2

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Teletype

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Radio

Portable voice radio receivers-transmitters connect the messenger room at Justice with DCC and the courier truck.

Appended hereto are documents pertaining to applicable legislation, Departmental guidelines, agreements between the FBI and other U. S. Government agencies, agreements between ID and GID, and other material deemed to be of assistance to personnel handling these matters.

8/17/73

8/17/73

b2
b6
b7C

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

AGENCY

NAME

OFFICE ADDRESS

OFFICE PHONE



HOME PHONE

CIA

NSC Staff

Domestic Council

FBI



Room 6B07

Room 6D26

Room 6G28

Room 396
Old EOB

Room 16
Old EOB

FBI Hdq.

FBI Hdq.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

8/17/73

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. Mark Felt

DATE: 12/14/72

FROM : E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR
TERRORIST ATTACK
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
am/mlt/elh

Felt ☒
Baker ☐
Callahan ☐
Cleveland ☐
Conrad ☐
Dalbey ☐
Gebhardt ☐
Jenkins ☐
Marshall ☐
Miller, E.S. ☐
Purvis ☐
Soyars ☐
Walters ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Mr. Kinley ☐
Mr. Armstrong ☐
Ms. Herwig ☐
Mrs. Neenan ☐

Cregar to Miller memorandum 11/10/72 captioned "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism" (attached) enclosed a proposed contingency plan of Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) to be utilized to the extent necessary in the event of a terrorist act, supervision of which rests with DID.

Mr. Armstrong attached an informal memorandum to Mr. Kinley 11/14/72 in which he raises two questions:

"(1) Does not a murder or a kidnaping investigation require certain investigative expertise in all cases without regard to whether 'political consideration, subversion or terrorist activity' is involved?"

"(2) If so, does DID, given the nature of its responsibilities, have the expertise to supervise these criminal investigations as effectively as they could be supervised by GID?"

Mr. Armstrong expressed opinion that these two questions should be answered in favor of GID.

In response to Mr. Armstrong's two questions and his opinion as to apparent lack of investigative expertise, I had a survey conducted of investigative expertise possessed by the Agents and officials of DID. I was quite impressed by the results of this survey.

The survey disclosed Agents in the Division have wide-ranging and impressive criminal investigative credentials, with extensive experience in some of the Bureau's major criminal cases.

The following is a statistical breakdown on the criminal experience of Agents in the Division. This is based on 125 Agents surveyed (total Division complement not surveyed due to leave, etc.).

Enclosure

ESM:glv

NOT RECORDED

11 JUN 18 1973

46 JUN 13 1973

CONTINUED - OVER

67 JUN 14 1973

5-185
MAIL ROOM

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. W. Mark Felt
Re: Contingency Plans for Terrorist Attack
Domestic Intelligence Division

Total criminal investigative experience represented: 410 years.

Total criminal supervisory experience (field and FBI Headquarters): 87 1/2 years. (There is an additional 50 years relief supervisory experience represented.)

Total criminal investigative experience prior to Bureau employment: 22 years.

Eighteen Agents have had some substantial experience investigating murder cases under various classification, principally Crime on Government Reservations; in addition, a number of Agents have handled UFAP cases, including Top Ten Fugitives, in which murder was the local crime committed.

Thirty-two Agents have had experience in investigating Bureau kidnaping cases and several of these were the more highly publicized kidnapings of recent years (the Condetti case in Washington, D. C.; the Coors case in Denver; the Jackson kidnaping-murder case in Virginia; the Greenlease kidnaping in Kansas City, etc.).

A number of DID Agents either supervised or were case Agents on major Bureau cases. A selected few of these cases are listed since they serve as a good indicator of the depth of criminal investigative experience in this Division.

1) Chicago investigation regarding Chicago syndicate leader Paul "The Waiter" Ricca. DID Agent handled as case Agent in Chicago and coordinated with INS-IRS deportation hearings and bribery trial of Ricca.

2) Major kidnaping case in Philadelphia Office in which SA Terry R. Anderson was killed by kidnaper; on-the-spot supervision afforded this case by DID Agent; under supervision of SAC, Agent was in charge of field forces at Shade Gap, Pennsylvania, from the time of killing of SA Anderson until kidnaper was shot and killed.

3) Major investigation in Miami in which a commercial Boeing 727 aircraft crashed, killing over 40 persons. This case was supervised in the field by an Agent currently assigned to DID.

Memorandum to Mr. W. Mark Felt
Re: Contingency Plans for Terrorist Attack
Domestic Intelligence Division

4). -Gangland murder in Kansas City, Missouri, in 1965 handled by DID Agent as case Agent. Handled as special with 40 Agents from other offices ordered in.

5) Bank robbery investigation in Washington, D. C., in which two Bureau Agents were killed was assigned to an Agent currently in DID. This Agent is heavily experienced in bank robbery investigations (was case Agent in over 150 bank robbery cases); he was substantially involved in investigations which led to solution of Jackson kidnaping-murder case in the Washington, D. C., area.

Reservist 6)- A civil rights special in 1967-1968 in the Charlotte Division was assigned to a DID Agent. Case resulted in arrest of 12 Klan members and numerous incidents of racial violence solved. This special involved as many of 48 Agents working on the case at one time.

kidnapings 7); Yablonski family murders in Pennsylvania in 1969 was a major case supervised by an Agent assigned to DID.

8) Another Agent in the Division, while assigned to Chicago in 1967, was supervisor of Dipbom case (bombings of Yugoslav Consulates in U. S.). Chicago was office of origin in this case.

serve as a good illustration of the role of the Bureau in this Department. DID Agents made substantial contributions to other major Bureau cases. For example, in the John Gilbert Graham bombing of the United Airlines plane in Colorado in the 1950's, a DID Agent had the specific assignment for investigation of all passengers and relatives. This culminated in the development of Graham as a suspect. The Condetti murder-kidnaping case in Washington, D. C., was solved by a particular witness; this witness was located by a DID Agent through line of investigation developed by the Agent.

by D.D. Anderson. This Division has a number of investigative responsibilities which require "criminal-type" investigation. This, of course, includes bombing violations, investigations concerning Weatherman fugitives, violations of espionage statutes where evidence is gathered for prosecution and conspiracy-type cases such as the Eastcon case. The Revolutionary Activities Section supervises cases in the ITSP and Federal Reserve Act categories which arise out of fraudulent check schemes perpetrated by revolutionary extremists, and investigations are also conducted under the National Firearms Act in cases involving procurement of illegal arms.

Memorandum to Mr. W. Mark Felt
Re: Contingency Plans for Terrorist Attack
Domestic Intelligence Division

Memorandum to Mr. W. Mark Felt
Re: Contingency Plans for Terrorist Attack
by DL Domestic Intelligence Division
offices ordered.

OBSERVATIONS:

Bureau Agent was assigned to this case. Agent is new. In response to Mr. Armstrong's first question, my personal belief is that an investigator is an investigator. He obtains facts and then takes the necessary action to bring his case to a logical conclusion. Experienced supervisory personnel at Headquarters do the same thing often in consultation with others. Therefore, it is my opinion, although they are important cases, that there is nothing unusually difficult about these investigations from a supervisory standpoint. Numerous incidents of racial violence since 1965. 48 Agents. In answer to the second question, it is my opinion we most certainly have whatever "expertise" is necessary to handle murder and kidnaping investigations. I base my opinion on sixteen years field experience as an investigator, major case coordinator, supervisor on three different criminal desks, supervisor-in-charge of the Bank Robbery Unit at Headquarters, and ASAC responsible for criminal investigations in three offices. Chicago was office of origin in this case.

I have great confidence in this Division and its personnel and can assure you that we can handle these investigations. For example, in the John Gilbert Graham kidnapping case. **RECOMMENDATION:** That consideration be given to approving the contingency plan attached with Cregar to Miller memorandum. Thereafter, copies will be furnished to all personnel having responsibilities under the plan.

Master copy of the plan will be maintained in the DID Duty Supervisor's Office, 1002 9th Building. number of investigations requiring require criminal-type investigations. Cases of course, include violations, investigations involving espionage statutes which involve espionage type cases such as the Elmer case. To supervises cases in out of fraudulent investigations are also involved in this case. *EM* *WGC* *DSF* *DMB*

DO-6 OFFICE OF ACTING DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Domestic December 18, 1972

To: Mr. Kinley

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60308

Re: Contingency Plans for
Terrorist Attack
Domestic Intelligence Division

Has Mr. Gray's illness or some other reason changed the plan to have these two questions discussed at Executives' Conference, as announced by him at the conclusion of the last Executives' Conference? In view of Mr. Gebhardt's initials on this memorandum (Miller to Felt, 12/14/72, on the above caption), such discussion would probably be unnecessary since I would have expected GID to be leading the opposition, if any opposition existed, to turning some murder and kidnapping investigations over to DID.

On an issue such as this I have no intention of trying to substitute my opinion for the considered judgment of the operating Divisions. My only concern in raising the questions was that DID's proposal did not have the support of GID. If GID and DID are agreed that the proposed arrangement was the best way to handle the matter, then I would pursue my questions no further.

plan and
will be
Master
Office

DMA:nm (2)

WMF

DMA
Daniel M. Armstrong, III

I want this aired at the 5165
Very next meeting of the
Executives Conference. Jm 12-20-72

MR. FELT
MR. BAKER
MR. CALLAHAN
MR. CLEVELAND
MR. CONRAD
MR. DALBEY
MR. GEBHARDT
MR. JENKINS
MR. MARSHALL
MR. MILLER, S.S.
MR. PURVIS
MR. SOYARS
MR. WALTERS
TELE. ROOM
MR. KINLEY
MR. ARMSTRONG
MS. HERWIG
MRS. NEENAN

ENCLOSURE

62-115360-
62-115360-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. E. Gebhardt
1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conmy _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 6/8/73

FROM : Forrest S. Putman, Jr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

On 6/6/73 captioned Committee met at the Department of State and a copy of the proposed agenda is attached. Also attached is copy of memorandum pertaining to New Anti-Hijacking Measures, copy of a kidnapping log relating to Consul General Terrance Leonhardy and copy of a press release dated 5/31/73 containing remarks of Charles N. Brown.

During the meeting a discussion was held concerning enforcement of PL 92-539 and particularly the 100 foot harassment restrictions. The Department of State wanted a broader interpretation of the Harassment section and felt that the Department of Justice was affording this a too restrictive interpretation. Various cases were discussed and the Department of Justice stated that whenever the facts warranted an authorization would be forthcoming. They also pointed out that this law did not preclude local prosecution and that in many instances where the Soviets are objecting to a lack of Federal handling local arrests have been made.

Department of State representative proposed that the FBI have Agents at all demonstrations and make on the spot arrests for violations. He was advised that the Bureau's policy is to arrest only following an authorization and that while we would have Agents in the vicinity in an effort to develop evidence, we would not in any manner attempt to police a demonstration and would not be making any on the spot arrests for alleged violation of the harassment section of the statute.

Also discussed was possible legislation preventing ransom payments by American companies abroad. Ambassador Meyer noted that this was merely an idea on his part and nothing has been written formally. Legal representative to the Department of State felt that such a law could be passed (I believe this is questionable) but that such a law would never get through Congress. The representative from the Department of Treasury noted that Secretary Shultz is particularly disturbed about this problem and they are attempting to see what might be done and in particular how these extremist actions are affecting our foreign investments.

Enclosures

ACTION:

None. For information.

FSP:cae (3)

REC-19

62-115380-34

JUN 14 1973

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

FROM : Forrest S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 6/18/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conmy _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

Captioned Committee met on 6/13/73, and a copy of the agenda is attached. During the meeting, a draft proposal of a memorandum for the President was submitted which is also attached. This memorandum reports progress of the Committee. No portions of this memorandum affect the FBI and no comments were necessary. *CP*

During the conference, a discussion was again held concerning the Justice Department's failure in the eyes of the State Department to give a more liberal interpretation to harassment under PL 92539. The FBI's position as a investigator and not as a policing agency was again set forth. It was decided there was a need for closer coordination between the State Department and the Department of Justice and the Department of Justice representative agreed to discuss this statute further with U. S. Attorney in New York. The Justice Department was not willing (FBI concurs) to any blanket authorization for harassment violations under this statute. However, the Justice Department did agree that in certain instances it might be advisable to have an Assistant U. S. Attorney on the scene during violations to make authorizations at that time.

ACTION:

None. For information.

ST-102

REC-3762-115360-35

2 ENCLOSURE

Enclosures

FSP:cae

(2) *SM*

50 JUN 27 1973

21 JUN 21 1973

5- *FSP*

~~SECRET~~

Classification per OGA letter
dated 05/17-2006

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. Shackelford
- 1 - Mr. Grigalus
- 1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 5/14/73

DATE: 10-28-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 *eth*

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
12-14-2031

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Belt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Baise
Mr. Barnes
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herrington
Mr. Conmy
Mr. Mintz
Mr. Eardley

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : F. S. Putman, Jr.

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

[Redacted]

b1
b3

[Redacted]

b1
b3

[Redacted]

b1
b3

ACTION:

ST-109

REC-62 62-115-360

36

[Redacted]

b1

E. S. Miller

w. w. w. w.

*Per Womall
& Miller - Gus Fypp
with 14 used in
of Douglas*

JUN 19 1973

FSP:cae
(4) *gmc*

Fypp

ABK

1. XEROX
JUN 26 1973

269
JUN 28 1973

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-80750-1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 6/25/73

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *Em*

FROM : F. S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conmy _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

The working group of captioned Committee met on June 20, 1973. A copy of the agenda is enclosed along with copy of the minutes of this meeting. Also enclosed is a memo containing a rundown of the protection for the Brezhnev party, as well as a memorandum concerning a conversation with Consul General Leonhardy.

ACTION:

None. For information.

90
ENCLOSURE

JEM *WAR*
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Enclosures

FSP:cae

(2) *gmk*

ST 113

REC-19

62-115360-37

7 JUN 26 1973

59 JUL 9 1972

148

5-FSP

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - F. S. Putman

DATE: 7/10/73

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *ED*

FROM : Forrest S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Baise _____
Mr. Barnes _____
Mr. Bowers _____
Mr. Herington _____
Mr. Conmy _____
Mr. Mintz _____
Mr. Eardley _____
Mrs. Hogan _____

J Attached is a copy of the agenda for the Working Group on June 27, 1973, as well as a copy of a memorandum which has been prepared for submission to the President from the Working Group.

No minutes of captioned meeting have been received.
Nothing affecting FBI.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures °

FSP:cae

(2) *gm*

ST-108

REC-61

62-115360-38

6 JUL 11 1973

2 ENCLOSURE

P131
54 JUL 18 1973

5- FSP

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

DATE: 7/17/73

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : F. S. Putman

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S CABINET COMMITTEE
TO COMBAT TERRORISM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt /elh

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

The members of the working group of captioned committee met on July 11, 1973. Attached is copy of the agenda as well as copy of the minutes. Pertinent parts of this meeting which affected the FBI have been handled by separate memorandum.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures - 2

FSP: jlb jeb
(3)

2- ENCLOSURE

EX-105

REC-67

62-115360-39

22 JUL 18 1973

JUL 11 3 28 PM '73

FBI JUSTICE
FBI WITNES

70 JUL 24 1973

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

DATE: 7/17/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : F. S. Putman

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S CABINET COMMITTEE
TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

b6
b7C

Members of the working group of captioned committee met on June 27, 1973, and a copy of the minutes is attached. Also attached is memorandum of [redacted] dated June 27, 1973, pertaining to measures taken to counter terrorism during the period January 1 to June 5, 1973. Nothing contained in either affect the FBI.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosures - 2

FSP: jlb
(3)

SI-106
REC 43

62-115360-40

MCT-45

22 JUL 18 1973

62-115360

REC 11

REC 11

FSP

57 JUL 27 1973

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/lt/13h, 1973

REC-15

62-115360-41
Honorable Armin H. Meyer
Special Assistant to the Secretary EX-105
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Meyer:

Thank you for writing on June 28th and commenting
as you did concerning the participation of Assistant Director
Miller and Special Agents Branigan, Cregar, Putman and Smith
in connection with the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.
I am pleased to know of your high regard for their perform-
ances and contributions and you may be sure they share my
gratitude for your thoughtfulness in writing.

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

MAILED 4

JUL 13 1973

FBI

- 1 - Mr. Miller - Enclosure
Personal Attention: Bring to the attention of Special
Agents William A. Branigan, William O. Cregar, Forrest S.
Putman and Thomas J. Smith.

NOTE: Bufiles disclose prior cordial correspondence with
Mr. Meyer. Upon approval, this letter should be routed to
the Personnel Records Unit of the Files and Communications
Division so that appropriate personnel file copies may be
prepared.

PLA:jc (4)

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Baker _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Gebhardt _____
Mr. Jenkins _____
Mr. Marshall _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Mr. Thompson _____
Mr. Walters _____
Room _____

AUG 6 1973

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *[Signature]*
FROM : Forrest S. Putman, Jr. *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman, Jr.

DATE: 7/30/73

DATE: 05-08-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3

05-08-2031

b1
Referral/Direct

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____

Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
President's Cabinet

(S)

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosure

[Signature]
ENCLOSURE

FSP:cae ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

(3) *[Signature]*

REC-33

62-115360-42

ST-104

31 AUG 7 1973

~~SECRET~~

8 AUG 16 1973

[Signature]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller, *AP*

DATE: 7/31/73

FROM : Forrest S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

DATE: 05-08-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc taw/dec/elh

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1, 6)
05-08-2031

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

b1
Referral/Direct

[Handwritten signature]

[Redacted]

(C)

[Redacted]

(C)

This would include determination as it relates to local protection (approved in memorandum Putman to Miller dated 7/16/73).

b1
Referral/Direct

Meeting of 7/18/73 requires no action by the FBI.

ACTION:

b6 PER FBI
b7C

None. For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[Handwritten signature]

Enclosures
FSP:cae
(3) *gk*

REC-58

62-115360-43

3 AUG 7 1973

EX-103

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

3. *[Handwritten mark]*

6444

52 AUG 5 1973

[Handwritten signature]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 7/16/73

FROM : F. S. Putman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-16-2005 BY 60309
mst/tam/mlt/elh

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE ON TERRORISM

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

On 7/11/73, working group of captioned Committee met. A discussion was held concerning the Alon murder and the new head of this working group, Ambassador Hoffacker was in attendance. Attached is copy of Department of State telegram concerning terrorism as it relates to a possible convention on taking of hostages. This is for information purposes only.

Also attached is copy of a working paper relating to a review of the Brezhnev visit. This paper on page three proposes to recommend that a centralized file should be kept by FBI of all incidents and arrests, Federal or local, of individuals that could pose a threat to the security of a visiting diplomatic delegation. Follow-ups should be made on court dispositions of these cases.

This is much too broad for the Bureau to comply with. However, it would be possible for us to maintain a list of all incidents falling under Public Law 92-539 (Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States).

Since correspondence is received on these incidents it would be a simple matter to maintain a centralized listing of these cases. However, to fully comply with this request we would have to maintain these cases in a pending status and have the field offices determine if local prosecution has been undertaken. It does not appear this would be an unreasonable hardship on the Bureau and such information would be of value in fully analyzing the implementation of this Law.

Enclosures -

FSP:jlh
(3)

CONTINUED - OVER

6 AUG 7 1973

XEROX


AUG 14 1973

185-00-
Unrecorded Copy Filed In

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
Re: Cabinet Committee on Terrorism

RECOMMENDATION:

If you agree, we will undertake to maintain a centralized file showing the incidents and individuals involved, where known, of all violations of Public Law 92-539. We will also instruct the field offices to follow each case which is deferred for local handling to determine if local prosecution is undertaken.



OK
EM

AIT TO
Albany ad
cell office
8/3/73
DRC/d/n

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309

1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
auc tam/mic/eh

DATE: 8/3/73

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : F. S. Putman

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO COMBAT TERRORISM

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

The Rand Corporation is presently conducting a survey and preparing a report in connection with terrorist activities, particularly as it relates to kidnappings and hostage situations.

On this date I was contacted by Mr. John Gatch, Deputy Coordinator of the working group of this committee who advised me that Rand Corporation officials were desirous of talking with FBI officials in connection with this matter. I was subsequently contacted by Steven T. Hosmer, who stated that he is doing the study for the Rand Corporation along with a [redacted] and they would be desirous of talking with people from the FBI concerning barricades and hostage situations and in particularly obtaining any information concerning the deportment of hostages and their relationship with the kidnappers. Although no classified material is involved, Mr. Hosmer stated that both he and [redacted] are cleared for classified information.

The above appears to be a logical request and could be of assistance in furnishing a profile relating to hostage-type terrorist acts.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That this be referred to Division 6 and that the Kidnapping Desk contact Mr. Hosmer at 296-5000 and discuss the hostage situation and kidnapping matters with him.

FSP:rbs
(4)

no pertinent info in indices re Hosmer n [redacted]

b6
b7C

Putman advised on 8/3/73 that this report is being prepared by Rand Corporation at request of President's Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. [redacted] which is a member of [redacted]

8/8/73 Tel. Call to Doctor Hosmer - arrangements made for meeting in Mr. Bates office, 8/14/73 at 10:30 AM. - attendees advised (Hussey, J.R. Adams, Davis, Bates, Hetherington & Mr. Gallagher) DGF

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Admin. _____
Comp. Syst. _____
Files & Com. _____
Gen. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Plan. & Eval. _____
Spec. Inv. _____
Training _____
Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller
FROM : Forrest S. Putman, Jr.
SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

DATE: 7/30/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-28-2005 BY 60309
auc tam/mlt/elh

Attached is copy of a memorandum dated 7/27/73 from Ambassador Hoffacker enclosing a proposed draft of a memorandum Pickering - to - Garment relating to diplomatic requests for additional security protection.

Memorandum is self-explanatory and no comments necessary from the FBI. It is noted that the Cabinet Committee fully understands that the FBI does not have any protective responsibilities but only investigative responsibilities under PL 92539.

ACTION:

None. For information.

Enclosure
FSP:cae
(3) *gyp*

62-115368-46
6 AUG 7 1973

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AUG 1 6 30 AM '73
AUG 10 1973

DOC. PASS

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *MD*

FROM : F. S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

DATE: 8/10/73

DATE: 05-08-2006

CLASSIFIED BY 60309 auc tam/dcg/elt

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3 (15)

05-08-2031

Assoc. Dir. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Cong. Serv. _____
Corr. & Crm. _____
Research _____
Press Off. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director Sec'y _____

(S)

Nothing affecting FBI interest involved.

b1
Referral/Direct

ACTION:

None. For information.

E. S. Miller
u

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures
FSP:cae
(4) *gfk*

REC-15

ST-104

62-115360-47

23 AUG 15 1973

=====

5: FSP

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *EM*

FROM : F. S. Putman, Jr. *FSP*

SUBJECT: CABINET COMMITTEE TO
COMBAT TERRORISM

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman

DATE: 8/14/73

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-05-2006 BY 60309
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Research _____
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Director Sec'y _____

b6
b7C

On this date, Supervisor Lionel E. Belanger and I met with [] of the Rand Corporation for the purpose of discussing terrorism. *M*

The Rand Corporation is presently doing a survey on terrorism as it relates to terrorist acts abroad. This survey is being financed by the Department of State and the Department of Defense, but is also being backed by the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, who is offering its complete cooperation. *3*

The discussion with [] was general in nature and pertained to our experiences in the terrorist field. He was furnished nonclassified Bureau documents relating to terrorism which documents were utilized in the Terrorism Symposium of January, 1973. *b6
b7C*

[] was most appreciative of the information furnished to him and stated that we would be able to follow the progress of the Rand Corporation with its study through our association with the Cabinet Committee. *b6
b7C*

ACTION:

None. For information.

REC-47
EX-103

64-15462-48

AP

AUG 16 1973

EM

FSP:cae
(3)

59 AUG 21 1973

5-FSP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 10-27-2005 BY 60309
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ENCLOSURE